Will Shutting Down Captive
Reinsurance Affiliates Reduce the Cost of Mortgage Insurance
to Borrowers?
Will Shutting Down Captive
Reinsurance Affiliates Reduce the Cost of Mortgage Insurance
to Borrowers?
On April 4,
2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
announced that it had taken “enforcement actions to end what
the Bureau believes to be improper kickbacks paid by
mortgage insurers to mortgage lenders in exchange for
business.” The kickbacks take the form of dividends paid by
captive reinsurers that purport to be a risk-sharing device
but are in fact a method of paying lenders for the referral
of business.
“Illegal kickbacks distort markets and can inflate the
financial burden of homeownership for consumers,” said CFPB
Director Richard Cordray.
CFPB is right
that mortgage reinsurance arrangements are really kickbacks
for the referral of business, but it is wrong in suggesting
that
eliminating them will reduce costs to borrowers.
In my view, it is just as likely, perhaps more
likely, that the cost to borrowers will increase.
Borrowers have
been over-paying for mortgage insurance over the years, and
also for title insurance and property appraisals, and the
underlying reason is the same.
In all three markets, the seller of the service is
selected by the lender but the cost is paid by the borrower.
This situation inevitably raises prices to borrowers
relative to what they would be if the sellers had to compete
directly for the patronage of the borrowers who pay for the
services.
When sellers
are selected by borrowers, selection is largely based on the
price of the service. When sellers are selected by lenders,
selection is based on whatever things of value the seller
can bestow on the lender, who is largely indifferent to the
price paid by the borrower.
Payment of
dividends from a reinsurance affiliate is only one method
used by mortgage insurers to compensate lenders for
referrals. Smaller lenders are compensated by free services,
including free loan underwriting, which can be justified on
the grounds that the insurer has to underwrite for its own
protection.
In the case of
title insurance and appraisals, the most common device used
to compensate lenders for the referral of business is shared
ownership of the title agency or the appraisal management
company to which the lender refers its business. If done by
the book, meaning that the affiliate does the work of such
an agency and is not a sham, these arrangements are legal.
From the
standpoint of the service sellers, all such arrangements are
marketing expenses, which must be covered by the prices they
charge borrowers.
Shutting down one particular method of compensating
lenders for business referrals forces them to adopt other
devices which could well be
more costly. If so, prices will rise rather than
decline.
The key to
price reductions for borrowers is to force service providers
to compete in terms of the price paid by borrowers, as
opposed to competing in terms of bribes paid to the lenders
who select them. There is a little bit of price competition
going on now in the title insurance market, where astute
borrowers are shopping for their own deals on-line. In the
mortgage insurance and property appraisals markets, however,
there is nothing happening and little prospect that anything
will happen without a major change in the rules.
The needed
rule change is extremely simple, and also extremely logical.
The rule should be that any service required by lenders as a
condition for the granting of a mortgage should be paid for
by the lender, with the cost embedded in the price of the
mortgage. In one swoop, this rule would replace competition
in the bribes paid to lenders with competition in the
prices paid by lenders.
If you are not
convinced that this rule change would benefit borrowers,
consider this hypothetical: suppose new automobiles were
sold without tires, and that to get tires you were directed
to a tire agency approved by the dealer, who would add the
price of the tires to his bill. Is there any doubt that the
price of the car plus tires would be higher than the price
now that includes the tires?
And don’t
overlook the free bonus.
The existing set of complicated rules establishing
the legality or illegality of various ways that lenders
compensate service providers, would be eliminated.
I doubt that
CFPB has the legal authority to make this change now, but it
can and should ask Congress for the authority it needs to do
the job for which it was chartered.
