When Is Regulation Excessive?
President Trump believes that Federal regulation is
excessive and has directed that task forces be set up at
each Federal agency to supervise and monitor the process of
finding regulations to cut. To my knowledge, he has not
provided any guidance to the agencies on how to do this, so
I decided to do it for him in this article.
Step 1: Define the Objective:
Counting the number of regulations is useless, what matters
is whether the objectives of regulation are being achieved.
Regulation is excessive when it does not accomplish its
objective, or when the cost of accomplishing the objective
through regulation is excessive, or when there is an
alternative to regulation that is less costly.
The objectives vary from agency to agency. My interest is in
financial regulation. This includes the market for home
mortgages, which I will use for my illustrations. The
agencies with regulatory responsibilities in this market
include HUD/FHA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
I will illustrate with two objectives, both of which are
designed to empower the “little guy.”
1. Reduce barriers to effective mortgage shopping.
2.
Reduce mortgage
transactions costs.
Step 2: Identify Remediable
Deficiencies
The major focus of the agencies in assessing their
regulations should be to identify the major deficiencies
that are preventing their objectives from being realized.
For the mortgage-related agencies, Step 2 would include the
following deficiencies bearing on the two objectives cited
above.
1.
Lender control of
appraisals makes them non-portable and lengthens transaction
periods, both of which impede the ability of borrowers to
shop effectively.
2.
The cost of title insurance
paid by borrowers is excessive relative to the costs
incurred in assessing the validity of titles.
Step 3: Assess Existing and
Alternative Regulations
I will illustrate with the two objectives and deficiencies
cited above.
The
Difficulty in Shopping:
The core problem potential
borrowers face in shopping for a mortgage is that critically
important information bearing on its price, including the
value of the property, is not available to them until after
they have applied for a loan and paid for an appraisal. For
a borrower to withdraw at this point in order to begin again
with another lender is difficult, costly and time-consuming,
so few do it.
Relevant
Existing Regulations:
The regulations applicable to
appraisals are a major source of the problem. While
borrowers pay for appraisals, the regulations place
responsibility and control with lenders, who order them
after a borrower has applied. This lengthens the period the
borrower must wait for the information needed to shop, and
it also means that the borrower who withdraws from the
process must pay for a new appraisal and wait out the
results once again.
A Better Regulatory Approach:
If regulations obliged lenders to accept an appraisal
ordered by a borrower from any approved appraisal management
company, the borrower would at last have the capacity to
shop for the best deal. With an appraisal in hand, the
shopper could invite multiple lenders to make a firm offer
at a specified date and time.
Making appraisals portable
is one of the simplest and most effective ways to empower
consumers. Bringing that about would require replacement of
one set of regulations with another set.
The Excessive Price of Title
Insurance: Assuring good
title is necessary for an effective housing and mortgage
market, but title insurance is not necessary
for that purpose.
Denmark has a reliable system of recording titles but no
title insurance.
Relevant Existing Law:
Existing law allows lenders to
shift to the borrower the cost of title insurance that
protects the lender. This prevents the efficient application
of existing technology that would reduce the cost of
assuring good titles to a small fraction of the cost of
title insurance. The problem is that lenders have no
financial incentive to shift to a more efficient system – in
fact, many have a financial interest in the title agencies
to which they refer customers.
A Better Regulatory Approach:
If the law required lenders
to pay for title insurance themselves, passing the cost to
the borrower in the price of the mortgage, lenders would
have an incentive to drive down the cost rather than to
share in the revenue. The result would be a precipitous
decline in the cost of title insurance, and eventually the
replacement of the industry with an automated system open to
all market participants.
If this new and very simple regulation applied to mortgage
insurance as well as title insurance, which should be the
case, it would make a large set of existing regulations
obsolete. These are the regulations that apply to referral
fees, which deal with such weighty matters as whether a
birthday present from a title agent or a mortgage insurance
salesperson, to a lender, constitutes a prohibited referral
fee. Good riddance.
Concluding Comment
The President says he wants to reduce the number of
regulations. I interpret that to mean that he wants to
replace regulations that are directed toward worthy
objectives but don’t work with regulations that do work, and
I have given some examples. Regulations that ought to be
scrapped rather than replaced will be discussed in another
article.
