Phasing Out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Second of the
Series)
Under Existing Arrangements, Private Lenders Will Not Replace Fannie and Freddie
The first article in this series examined the two obvious
strategies for expanding private sector lending as a
replacement for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The first,
expansion of portfolio lending by depository lenders, is not
an option because home mortgages have become increasingly
unattractive to them. This is mainly a consequence of the
financial crisis, which showed that home prices didn’t
always rise, prices could also decline, and when they did,
losses from mortgage defaults would balloon. These losses
included heavy financial penalties imposed by Government on
the largest lenders, who were considered responsible for
what went wrong.
The second option, revival of the private secondary market
that collapsed during the crisis, is not feasible either –
it may take a generation for investors to forget how badly
they were burned. But even if they forgot more quickly, we
should not attempt to revive that market because it is a
“fair weather model” – it cannot withstand stress. The major
problem is that each individual mortgage security is a
stand-alone entity that is nobody’s liability. If the
reserves or insurance protections embedded in a security are
inadequate, that security will default, never mind that 100
other securities have more protection than they need. What
is needed is a more robust secondary market.
The Tested Danish Model Is Available For Adoption
The good news is that a tested model exists in Denmark. In
the Danish model, every mortgage security is a bond that is
a liability of the firm issuing it. The Danish mortgage
banks issue separate bonds for each type of mortgage, and if
one of them experiences a high loss rate, all the resources
of the bank are available to deal with it. There has never
been a default on a Danish mortgage bond in over 200 years.
During the very worst months of the financial crisis, it was
business as usual in the Danish mortgage bond market. And
more recently, during the worst months of the Euro-zone
crisis, it has been business as usual in the Danish market.
The core of the Danish system is an institution called a
“mortgage bank” which originates mortgage loans and
simultaneously funds each one in the bond market. The
mortgage banks also service the loans they make on behalf of
the bondholders. We have no such firms. Our mortgage banks
originate loans which they may or may not service, and sell
them. When they did securitize loans before the crisis, it
was on a block (rather than loan-to-loan) basis, and the
security was a stand-alone for which the mortgage bank
assumed no liability.
Transition to the Danish Model
To convert some of our existing mortgage banks into
Danish-style mortgage banks (henceforth DMBs) may require
enabling legislation at the Federal level, but that is the
least of it. A DMB will require more capital than any
existing mortgage bank has, and to generate the margins
required to earn an adequate return on capital, the bonds it
sells must be priced as very low risk investments. To meet
these requirements, DMBs will need a helping hand.
Fannie and Freddie should provide the needed assistance, but
under the supervision of the Federal Housing Finance Agency
which will monitor the development of DMBs and the
associated phase-out of Fannie/Freddie. To provide the
additional capital required by newly-chartered DMBs, the
agencies could purchase non-interest-bearing capital notes
from them, which must be paid off over a specified period.
The capital note repayment period would be long enough for
the DMB to generate the retained earnings needed to retire
the notes.
The initial series of bonds issued by DMBs would carry
Federal guarantees, but these bonds would be open-ended only
for a specified period. Beyond the bond guarantee period,
new mortgages would be funded by bonds that are guaranteed
by the DMB but not the Government. The bond guarantee period
would be long enough for the DMB to demonstrate that its
bonds were safe and sound investments without a Federal
guaranty.
Existing mortgage banks are the most logical candidates to
become DMBs, and the most logical constituency for moving
the development through the political process. In our
political system, nothing much gets done without a push by
an entity with some political clout that has a strong
interest in getting it done. Nonetheless, DMBs could also be
formed de novo, or as affiliates of depositories or other
types of financial firms.
The phase-out of Fannie/Freddie would be tied to the growth
of DMB bonds without Federal guarantees. As DMB lending
increases, Fannie/Freddie lending can decrease.
This proposal is not a quick way to get rid of
Fannie/Freddie, but there is no quick way that would not
seriously disrupt the market. The alternative to a slow fix
is no fix.
Note: My thanks to Alan Boyce for helpful comments. Boyce
suggests, as an alternative to purchasing capital notes from
DMBs, that FHFA could provide them with full faith and
credit reinsurance. This is an alternative worth
considering.
